Abstract: This article explores the emergence of property as a moral convention. To understand this process I make use of several laboratory experiments on property in its nascence. These experiments illustrate how a rule of property arises from our knowledge of what is morally right, and not vice versa. I also argue that while the ultimate end of property is our interest in using things, the proximate end of property is not losing them, i.e., the end of a rule of property is to secure from morally unfounded harm.
takes the messenger bag from my shoulder. Exactly how is an ability to consume a right, or property, or a property right?
The fear in broaching property as a moral concept is that when we look into the box of morality, we are privy only to our own moral values and so we must settle for plumping for what feels right to us. Moral reasoning, however, is as much objective as it is subjective. When we find ourselves in a new situation with strangers we can search our personal databank of experiences for common principles that might bring agreement. The twelve jurors who unanimously convict my thief can agree in and on principle because morality is not purely subjective.
On the mistaken second point, a right to do X is not a simple irreducible concept in English, nor is its cognates in French (droit), German (Recht), or Italian (diritto). Meaning 9d in the Oxford English Dictionary-the legal, equitable, or moral entitlement to do something, reveals two conceptual units of a right to do X, the first of which is morality. Presuming that the legal connotation historically follows and is derivative of the moral connotation (Salmond, 1907) , it would be tempting and convenient in the modern era of legislature-instituted rights to subsume the moral sense within the legal sense. But as positively uncomfortable as it may be to economists, morality is a critical component of understanding the emergence of property. The other key concept is entitlement, the grounds for laying a claim, not any claim, but a moral claim to do X. This brings to the foreground the assertion of and an appeal to facts as part of a justification for doing something. Wierzbicka (2006) argues that the word right as an adjective has three senses (moral, intellectual, and conversational), which are all unique to English. One common thread to each sense is that "human conduct can be seen and assessed 'objectively,' 'rationally,' and in accordance with 'evidence.' There are 'rules', there are 'procedures,' and there are objective criteria that people can refer to" (p. 79). As an entitlement to do something, a subsidiary sense of empiricism similarly permeates the noun right with appeals to rules and evidence to support a moral claim to do something.
While appeals to empirics almost always have a positive connotation in English, empirique in French is rarely neutral and mostly negative (Wierzbicka 2010) . 4 So, we should not be surprised that droit, the French word of import for the abstract noun right, does not evoke evidentiary appeal and is conceptually decomposed in French differently. The online Dictionnaire de l'Académie française defines droit, in the sense demanded, as ce qui est juste; ce qui est conforme à une règle implicite ou édictée, i.e., that which is right (juste); that which is consistent with an implicit or enacted rule. Again, droit carries both a moral and a legal sense, but for our purposes the important semantic work to note is in the explicit evocation of following a rule, an implicit rule, a moral rule. What is translated into English as the adjectival right is the French word juste, which when one realizes that Latin in classical Roman times had no letter j and instead used the letter i, indicates that we have made a full turn to the epigraph and its keystone of ius.
Theoretical aim
One of the three classical Roman uses of ius is "a right, moral or legal," as in the familiar Justinian phrase ius suum cuique tribuere (Salmond 1907: 467) . 5 That is the meaning, albeit notably not as a substantive, that Hayek (1973) situates in his translation of the Julius Paulus maxim in the epigraph. In this article I will use that maxim to explicate a theory of the emergence of property as a moral convention, and to understand the maxim I will make use of several laboratory experiments on property. One element of my approach is Demsetzian. If "the emergence of property rights can be understood best by their association with the emergence of new or different beneficial and harmful effects" (Demsetz 1967: 350) , such as a case study of the Native American trade of beaver pelts on the Labrador peninsula, then the novel circumstances of laboratory economies likewise present an opportunity to further that theory by observing property in its nascence, with the additional benefit that these virtual economic terraria are replicated several times over.
Given the unexamined use of the term property rights in economics, the tendency in economics is to think out the question of what property is in terms of how property is known, viz., the externally surmisable benefits and costs of using a resource. What Demsetz did not have access to were the moral debates concerning such benefits and costs that the Labrador Native Americans engaged in to establish new rules of property. In this article I mean to focus on the actual deliberations of strangers interfacing in an unfamiliar context, out of which emerges, or fails to emerge, a mutual delineation of Mine (meum) and Thine (tuum).
My theoretical framework is founded in rule-guided action and rule-guided perception, which will, in turn, rely on morality. Following Hayek (1973) , a rule "means simply a propensity or disposition to act or not act in a certain manner, which will manifest itself in what we call a practice or custom" (original emphasis, p. 75), with the practice or custom in question for this article being what I will call property. Articulating the relationship between the rules of property and the manifest practice of them is a crucial step that this paper takes, and as we shall see, one that is impossible for neoclassical economics to take. What a theory of the emergence of property needs is an approach that begins by treating property as a sphere of actions, perceptions, and things that appears regularly in human intercourse. Thus I endeavor to demarcate an uncontended core of the property of things (i.e., chattels) that gives the more complex and contentious cases, such as externalities and land, the classic Blackacre or riparian zones, whatever import they have. 
Rules, rule-following, and custom
Our sense of what is right consists in the capacity to follow rules, rules that we do not "know" in the sense that we can declare them all axiomatically, but "know" in the sense of being able to describe roughly what actions are consistent, or not, with this or that rule (Hayek 1963) . If this is not self-evident, try listing all the rules of polite conversation. Have you included what "do not bore" or "do not dominate" or "be responsive" means? These may not even be first on your list of general rules of conversation, and yet when we are challenged with someone who imperviously breaks one out of the uncountable myriad of rules, we can call forth ex tempore the specific rule relevant for this encounter. We have a kind of a background sense which, although quite unarticulable, allows us to formulate in the foreground a reason as to why this person has attenuated the genial atmosphere.
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The first implication of not being able to explicitly know/specifically state the rules that govern how we act is that only in their totality does a whole system of rules, the practice or custom, form the sense of how to conduct ourselves rightly (Hayek 1952) . To embed our understanding of property in practices is to consider it as implicit in our rule-guided actions, and hence we are going well beyond the brute economistic weighing of benefits and costs. In short, our actions are governed by abstract rules, not concrete algorithms of benefit-cost analysis. As sensitive as our actions are to the external benefits and costs of our circumstances, much of our intelligent action arises from knowledge that is largely inarticulate. Moreover, the assessments of benefits and costs that we do make are only intelligible against the background provided by this inarticulate understanding. The practice provides the context within which the assessment of benefits and costs makes the sense that it does. Benefits and costs are only islands in the sea of property. Strategically important islands they may be, but islands nonetheless.
The second implication is that the rules that govern our actions also govern our perceptions of actions (Hayek 1963) , and it is rule-guided perception that poses the fundamental problem for the emergence of property as a moral convention. While different individuals will recognize a specific set of circumstances as one of the same kind involving property, we are unable to present the precise stimulus condition that will replicably produce the same perception in different people and hence the same action in different people. Ruleguided perceptions carry the understanding in patterns of appropriate action, which conform to a sense of what is right for this circumstance. But while agents can perceive when they or others have or have not done what is right, that others share that perception is not foregone. The perception of an action as one of kind that fits a pattern of what is right depends critically on the agency being shared.
Actions constituted as a practice are shared among those who practice the practice because the common perception of the action has integrated the individual agents into a shared regularized whole, a "we". Shared perceptions serve as the foundation for actions within a practice, actions which are, what Bakhtin (1982) calls, dialogic, in continual active dialogue and multilaterally extending to and from an agent. A rule doesn't apply itself. It must be followed in real time, under ever-fluxional circumstances, and against the unarticulated background of the entire practice. The interpretation of what a rule means is done on the fly and in dialogic concert with those around the agent.
In contrast, framing property rights as the internalization of the benefits and costs of an individual's right to use a resource, in response to others, is monologic. Specifying a property right as "W has the right to do X with Y," doesn't allow for the difference between the formulation and its application in particular circumstances of time and place. It also doesn't take account of the bi-directional relationship between a rule and the entire custom of property. The custom is what keeps the rule active, and the application of the rule reaffirms the custom. But the current application of the rule also modifies the custom by amalgamating into the background all of the unarticulable nuances of its application here and now. Stating that what is owned are rights to use resources is like Macbeth numbly concluding that life "is a tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing." Macbeth is engaging no one, and no one him. He is simply responding to the news of Lady Macbeth's death in a moment of epiphany. Enter a Messenger.
Ex iure quod est regula fiat
In the external relations of free Roman men Mackeldey (1883) explains one meaning of ius as ius est norma agendi, which he translates as ius "is a rule of conduct" (p. 1). Finally, we consider the negative portion of Julius Paulus' maxim: Non ex regula ius sumatur. The reason then why the ius, literally translated, is not taken out of the rule, is because the unarticulable background cannot be taken out of an articulated foreground. The everyday practice of what is right is not derived from a rule, not only because the custom is unarticulable in toto, but also because a rule not summoned from custom cannot anticipate the unknowable local circumstances under which it might conflict with another rule subsumed within the practice of what is right.
We are now in the position to apply rather straightforwardly Julius Paulus' maxim to the case of property: A rule of property regarding things arises from our background knowledge of what is right regarding things. To explicate this proposition I will draw from the spontaneous conversations of participants in the laboratory experiments reported in Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) , Kimbrough (2011) , Wilson et al. (2012) , and Jaworski and Wilson (2013) . Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) is the first experiment to explore how property emerges as a convention in the laboratory. The basis for the heuristic experiment is a platform designed by Crockett, Smith, and Wilson (2009) who explore how a market might emerge endogenously when participants have to discover (a) that trade is possible and that once discovered, (b) specialization is then possible to exploit the wealth-creating benefits of trade. Crockett, Smith, and Wilson (2009) took the institution of property for granted and built the platform accordingly: What one could produce and what one could consume, no one could interrupt. The simple change that Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) make to the platform is to relax that assumption built into the software. Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) experiment. Every session consists of eight participants who each control the production of two types of fictitious goods, red and blue. In Figure 1 , Person 2 controls the production displayed in the rectangle numbered 2 (and in green only on Person 2's screen), which is called a field. All participants are informed in the instructions, deliberately in the passive voice, that:
Platform 1: The homestead
When the clock expires [at the end of the period], you earn cash based upon the number of red and blue items that have been moved to your house. To select items to be moved, left click on an item or click on the red or blue buttons at the top of the screen. The yellow highlighted items can be moved by dragging with the right mouse button.
Person 2's house is in green (on Person 2's screen). What the participants are not told is that they can move items to other people's houses and fields [as was only the case in Crockett, Smith, and Wilson (2009) ] and that they can move items from other people's houses and fields. The participants must discover that such movements of items are possible.
The participants are also not informed, but can discover, that the odds (evens) are capable of increasing returns for producing red (blue):
For the first 10 seconds of each period, you will produce items in your green field. Using the scroll bar in the upper middle portion of your screen, you can change the proportion of each second allocated to producing red and blue. Each person's production is displayed on their field.
An odd (even) can earn 30 (26) cents in autarky, but with specialization and exchange at the competitive price, an odd-even pair can earn 90 and 80 cents, respectively. Anytime an item is moved to another person, the movement is recorded in a chat room in the middle of the screen, and anytime an item is moved from another person, the movement is recorded in red. Key for this article, at any time during the session, the participants are free to chat with the other participants in one of the two publicly accessible chat rooms. The instructions for the chat room give the participants wide latitude within an explicit constraint of civility:
Everyone in this experiment can send text messages. Everyone can read all posted messages. In the center of the screen, you can type a message in the line in either of two chat rooms and click on the Send button.
Under your house you can also post a one-line message that will be visible at all times to the other players.
You are free to discuss all aspects of the experiment, with the following exceptions: you may not reveal your name, discuss side payments [outside of the laboratory], make threats, or engage in inappropriate language (including such shorthand as 'WTF'). If you do, you will be excused and you will forfeit your earnings.
Unlike the well-circumscribed action spaces in traditional economic experiments, this one is as wide open as the Wild West. Participants interact in real time from the moment the experiment begins until it concludes 67 minutes later. The software imposes no order of moves, except that red and blue are produced during the first 10 seconds of a period and that consumption occurs at the moment the period concludes 90 seconds later. In Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) and Jaworski and Wilson (2013) the participants start in pairs, and without hint or notice, two pairs appear as one group of four on the screen, and finally the two groups of four become one group of eight, but in Kimbrough (2011) all eight people are together for the entire session (which actually makes things more unsettling). The participants inhabit a hurly-burly uncertain world. The experience is fast-paced, you might even say suspenseful, to such an extent that after a pilot session, we made every 7 th period a day of rest in which nothing is produced but during which the participants can still converse with each other.
At this point the naysayer interjects to make the original observation that the participants live a physical world with secure property and that we gave the participants their own house and field in the virtual world. So what can this experiment help us understand about the emergence of property as a moral convention? My riposte is that obviously my coauthors and I are not claiming to have recreated the Big Bang of property. That would be cool but a little dangerous. Instead we are observing how real people making decisions of salient monetary consequence interface with each other on a frontier with no externally-enforced custom of property. Some groups will succeed and prosper, and some will fail and spectacularly so. The question is, can we identify why from a complete historical record of what happened, including their heat-of-the-moment conversations? New experiments can also be designed to test any ex post synthesis.
10 If a nagging intuition questions whether endowing the participants with their exclusive control over a field and house is important to these observations from the laboratory, then let's bring that to the foreground.
Platform 2:
The open sea Ellickson (1989) Figure 2 displays the software interface for the experiment.
Each participant, first in pairs and then later without notice as a sextet, control a stick figure which can move around the white open area in the middle the screen. The range of vision for a stick figure is limited to the gray area displayed in Figure 2 for Orange. White circles move randomly around the wide Sargasso Sea until a stick figure right clicks on one within its range. Five seconds later the computer determines according to an unannounced probability whether the stick figure is successful in hauling in the circle. Within that five seconds, however, any other stick figure within range or capable of reaching the circle, can also "throw a line" and attach itself to the circle. Each whole circle is redeemable for v = 60 or 100¢, depending upon treatment. However, if multiple people are probabilistically successful, each successful participant only receives a 1/n 2 -portion of the whole circle. Thus, (1 -1/n)v of value is wasted if multiple people lay claim to the same circle the lies free for any taker. After 90 seconds for "gathering"/"catching" circles, the stick figures figuratively return to port for 60 or 90 seconds, depending upon treatment, and are free to discuss anything in the experiment within the same guidelines reported above.
To test Ellickson's proposition that different circumstantial conditions lead to different rules of capture, the stick figures could use two different lines to gather circles, or as it is explained in the instructions:
On the top right side, you will see the number of lines that you have left. There are two types of lines, regular and colored which can be selected by using the appropriate radio button next to them. Both lines work in the same way with one exception. If you hit a circle with a colored line, the circle will turn your color whether or not the computer determines you are successful in catching it.
Later, the instructions inform them that:
You may also purchase additional lines by clicking on the BUY button next to the type of line you would like to purchase. The cost of the lines is taken out of your earnings. You will be given an initial allotment of lines. After that you will be able to purchase colored lines for 12¢ [or 20¢ depending on treatment] and regular lines for 6¢ [10¢].
With regular lines, the participants can implement the whaling rule which was called fast-fish, loose-fish. If a ship's harpoon was in the whale and held fast to the boat, no one else would attempt to catch that whale. However, if the harpoon was not attached to the boat, that is, the fish was loose, then the whale was fair game for any other ship to harpoon. Ellickson notes that whalers in the North Atlantic used this rule for preying upon right whales, a slow-moving baleen whale that doesn't dive when harpooned and isn't particularly feisty.
When whaling moved off the coast of the U.S., American whalers preyed upon sperm whales, which have teeth, will use them on a boat, and will dive pulling the boat down with them. With this change in conditions, Ellickson reports that American whalers switched from a fast-fish, loose-fish rule to what was called iron holds the whale. If a ship's harpoon is attached to whale and identifiable so, then no other ship would attempt to catch the whale. The colored lines allow the participants to identify the first striker. The reason why they are more expensive in the experiment is so that the participants can reveal-prefer a colored line to a regular line. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. In the first the circles move slowly are easy to catch on the first strike with p = .75. In the second, the whales move 50% faster and were three times more difficult to catch on the first strike (q = .25). In a subsequent third treatment, the participants first experienced right-like whales for the first two-thirds of the session and then unannounced the same-looking circle began behaving like a sperm whale.
What is 'What is right'?
Despite the functional differences in the platforms, common themes run through the discussions of both types of experiments and the emergence of property follows the same process in both platforms. The undergraduate students only participated in one session within a platform and only a small number of the 480 participants would have been recruited to participate in both platforms. As the excerpts of the instructions above hint, the instructions are deliberately sparse. We beam the strangers onto an unfamiliar virtual world, like Jean-Luc Picard and the metaphor-phonic Dathon, and ask them to make sense of each other in whatever comes next. The question is whether and how they make it work.
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Not surprisingly, at the beginning of the session or when additional stick figures or houses and fields suddenly appear around them, the participants use the chat room to get their bearings. The screen is a picture in the foreground, but what is the sense that lies in the background? What subsidiary perception fits the application of the representation in focus? The chat transcripts provide a glimpse into the sense they are attempting to make. 13 Notice first that while the instructions on actions are amoral, and in the first platform presented in the passive voice, the participants readily imbue the observed actions with morality, calling certain movements of pixelated chits and certain clicks on a circle "stealing".
This isn't a rare occurrence. According to the 450 million word Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), the frequency of the word steal is 20,296 (#1,798 on the list and right below politician).
14 The four experiments discussed in this article include a total of 480 participants in 60 sessions who typed 175,143 words (space delimited units of text). The words steal, stealing, steals, stole, and stolen appear correctly spelled 397 times. That is 50.3 times the frequency in the COCA. 15 -But of course they call this "stealing". They come from a physical universe with formally and informally enforced property.-The question to ask, if you are not peering into the mists of time, is: Why is it that the perceptions of these participants lead them to apply that word with its full moral force to these particular circumstances?
Note also how B, D, and G perceptionally parse the context into one of two big bins. Either we help each other, work together, and collaborate or we selfishly work against each other and steal from one another. D and G are in part seeking clarification on what is right in this virtual world, but why pose the question? They are re-cognizing the background and have a subsidiary interest in the first perceptual bin, which is the first alternative in each of the three cases. Not once do I recall the question in the transcripts being posed in the form of, "Should we be trying to be selfish or is helping each other the way to go?" D and G are also raising the question as the foundation for seeking agreement on the former of the two possible answers. The problem then becomes one of integration into a "we": E: do you want to do this the right way? F: wht is the right way E: the right way is I produce red you make blue then we split it nobody gets 100 percent profit but we both win F: tht wat i been doing then u started stealing F: [E] do u wanna start talkin about maximizing our production or keep fighting over it?
Integrating into a regularized whole involves changing the moral view of those that do not perceptually share the same background of what is right. Observed contradictions are one hurdle. F claims that E's harmonizing plan is inconsistent with his or her prior actions. Another hurdle is virtual vertigo. The declaration of "im confused" is not uncommon in this type of experiment following digitization into the e-world. In platform 1, the transition is achieved by clarifying, as E does, how to specialize and trade. 16 But there is also moral confusion: This is one of the rare cases of an obdurate "baller" chatting with, or better, antagonizing everyone else. Individuals who have not attuned themselves to the group are generally quiet to the point of ignoring pleas to engage in conversation.
18 A, C, and D have integrated into a regularized "we" who are "working together" and "helping each other" (these are common phrases across sessions), but B clearly has not. B is interrupting the dialogue of A, C, and D and challenging the integration of the We, which the We remonstrates as "hurting us". E: seriously people your going to mess it up for everyone because this will turn into everyone messing eachothers up E: and noone winning But why will this mess it up for everyone is a good question, and relevant to answering the bigger question of how do moral sentiments undergird the rule of property that emerges.
Harm, resentment, and property
Consider Baller B and the We of A, C, and D. The We perceive certain clicks of B's mouse as stealing that screws them over and hurts them. If they leave the experimental session with zero earnings, they still receive $7 for showing up on time, which is more than they walked into the laboratory with. So what makes B's clicks hurtful to the We? A, C, and D perceive themselves to be falling from a superior to an inferior position, the superior position being that each person is the only person who controls how much red and blue are produced in one specific field. For each person there is also only one house that will convert red and blue items at the end of the period into cash earnings, provided items have been moved to it. The inferior position obviously is no red and blue items in either a field or house following B's clicks and hence no cash earnings. Adam Smith summarizes the situation to a tee when placed in the context of this session (1759: 82-3):
To disturb [the We's] happiness merely because it stands in the way of [B's] own, to take from [A, C, and D] what is of real use to [A, C, and D] merely because it may be equal or of more use to [B] , or to indulge, in this manner, at the expence of other people, the natural preference which every man has for his own happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial spectator can go along with… Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts according to this principle, and that how natural soever it may be to him, it must always appear excessive and extravagant to them… Part of the background of what is right, as Smith details above, is that "there can be no proper motive for hurting our neighbour" (Smith 1759: 82) . 21 B's clicking on the red and blue items in the fields and houses not under his control is an act contrary to the ius, an iniuria, not just in the secondary sense of harm in the modern use of the word injury, but also in the primary moral sense of an act contrary to what is right. With the hope of bringing him into the group, the We are showing up B in the dialogue to be callous and morally perverse so that a rule of property may emerge. In Platform 1 (the homestead), the form of the rule seems rather straightforward. In one lone case, someone spells it out precisely as a rule:
E: but let's start with the rule of: don't take stuff from other people's houses or fields While this rule may appear obvious, it is not the only possible rule of property for Platform 1. When followed in real time and under fluctuating circumstances, a different rule may arise out of a minor change in the background. Recall that the design in Kimbrough (2011) slightly differs from the others in that all eight participants are together from the beginning of the session. Because the harmony of possession is more difficult to achieve from the outset in octets than in duets, every single one of Kimbrough (2011) sessions discusses a different rule never proposed elsewhere in Platform 1, namely: E: the fields are fairgame, lets decide on that from now on, nobody takes ANYTHING from a house, if you have stuff to share you can put it in your field
The same process is at work in Platform 2. When a stick figure is the first to click on freely roaming white circle, the first striker suffers harm (probabilistically) when anyone else subsequently clicks on the same circle. As "things", these pixels on a computer screen are within the virtual grasp of the whalers and homesteaders before a Baller B snatches them away. This perception of harm is the common thread across these two different platforms and why double clicking a circle is considered just as much to be stealing as moving red and blue items out of a creator-endowed field or house. In both platforms, the different participants perceive the actions of the Baller B-types as one of the same bad kind. Just as the We resent B, so integrated groups of stick figures in Platform 2 also resent the iniuria of double clicking on circles, which can prompt them to retaliate: Regardless of the form of the rule that arises out of the background to fit the local circumstances, there is a compelling emotion, which Adam Smith astutely identifies, that buttresses the sentiments regarding a rule of property as moral: "Resentment seems to have been given us by nature for defence, and for defence only...It prompts us to beat of mischief which is attempted to be done to us, and to retaliate that which is already done" (Smith 1759: 79) . In a two-page long footnote, Smith anticipates and refutes a reluctance to accept resentment as part of a sense of moral demerit (p. 76):
it is evident, counterparts to one another; and if our sense of merit arises from a sympathy with the one, our sense of demerit can scarce miss to proceed from a fellow-feeling with the other.
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Within the integrated community, everyone empathizes with everyone else in their resentment of the harm inflicted by people like D, the self-proclaimed master. This empathy is a necessary component for supporting a rule of property, and what makes this empathy palpable is that the individuals have harmonized into a We. Resentment is the emotion, the predisposition, that makes the rule of property a moral goal. The rule of property is moral, not merely because the community is in fact committed to the rule, but because the community feels compelled through resentment to commit to the rule. When E says above that "seriously people your going to mess it up for everyone because this will turn into everyone messing eachothers up," E is concerned that the commitment to the rule might erode. That it often doesn't in the presence of an incorrigible is a testament to the work that morality does. 23 Resentment of harm, the mutual empathy of desiring to avoid harm, and the compelling moral commitment to a rule to avoid harm are what give meaning to property as a practice. Rose (1985) argues that possession is the origin of property. Unlike the concept of a RIGHT or POSSESS, HAVE is a universal semantic prime, an innate concept; it is not further decomposable into simpler semantic units and every language appears to have a word for HAVE (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002) . 24 As we easily intuit, to possess is to have, but to have is not to possess. Smith (1894) discriminates the two words in English, and so strikingly so for my purposes that I beg pardon for the extended quotation (p. 622; font effects modified to conform with this article):
HAVE versus POSSESS
Have is a simpler and wider term than possess, possession being a mode of having. While the universality of HAVE makes have a more appealing cornerstone than possess for a theory of the emergence of property, the distinction of the two more importantly situates Rose's project within mine. As Smith (1894) articulates, possess connotes an external orientation that have does not, and the discussion in Rose (1985) exudes that external orientation to the world. Acts of possession serve as a "statement", and in an illuminating analogy, "texts" are to be "'read' by the relevant audience at the appropriate time" (pp. 77 and 82-83). Why must the act to possess be taken? To express a more permanent power or control to the external world, because simply having can be transitory. It is curious that possess nominalizes more flexibly than have. To possess Y can lead to a condition of Y being a possession, but to have Y is more mutable and is only nominalizable by the gerund. It makes sense to say that Until there is an act to possess Y, there is no possession of Y. But compare that with *Until there is an act to have Y, there is no having of Y. Neither clause sounds right, and at best it's a tautology. What this means is that acts to possess are rules of property that have come to the foreground for particular circumstances. What Rose (1985) considers to be the origination of property is the formalization of these rules in common law.
This article drills down to the universal and simpler bedrock level of HAVE. At any moment in time, my participants have red and blue items, but when the items are continually circulating, they do not possess them. Once they have established a rule, say that "the fields are fairgame [and] nobody takes ANYTHING from a house", then moving items from someone else's field into your own house becomes an act to possess. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, have is descended "from a primitive sense to hold (in hand)". Because we resent the harm when things are ripped from our hands, when we are not masters of what we have, we seek to become masters of what we possess through a rule of property. Mutual empathy towards harm converts islands of individuals who have into individual members of a We who possess. Once we have a rule, the moral commitment to the rule sustains the rule as part of the manifest practice or tradition of property.
Pierson v. Post
Sometime between 1800 and 1803, there was an incident on a Long Island beach between Lodowick Post and Jesse Pierson regarding a fox (Berger 2006 The court had to decide what the rule of property is for ferae naturae that lie free for any taker with a good line of sight. Post considered the rule to be identifiable hot pursuit and Pierson the first to have the varmint in hand. 26 The participants in Platform 2 similarly have to settle on a rule of capture. They, however, had no recourse to courts to decide for them following a dispute. Wilson et al. (2012) find that if civil-minded participants settle on a rule, they readily adopt fast-fish, loose-fish rule with slow, easy-to-catch right whales (so-named because they are the right whale to hunt). We, however, do not replicably observe iron holds the whale, even when the prey switched from right to sperm whales within a session. Mixing one's labor with pursuit, plus, in the case of the experiment, sinking the cost of a colored line do not have the same regularizing effect. Why might that be? Adam Smith explains that "[t]o be deprived of that which we are possessed of, is a greater evil than to be disappointed of what we have only the expectation" (1759: 84). The difference is that having a circle in hand creates positive harm when it is ripped from the hand, and the disappointment of expectations is just that, a disappointment. The former is emotionally hotter and hence easier to mutually empathize with when agreeing to a rule.
That's not to say that Post cannot get emotionally hot with disappointed expectations. The rumor is that the parties each spent £1,000 in 1805 on lawyer fees (Fernandez, 2006) . 27 When the new circumstances of time and place bring to the foreground a conflict in expectations, " [t] he task of rules of [property] can only thus be to tell people which expectations they can count on and which not" going forward (Hayek 1973: 102) . The court decided that having the fox in hand is an act to possess and prevents more confusion. I would add that the clarity of the rule coincides with and is supported by a stronger emotional response, for once the prey is in hand it becomes more closely connected with one's self. 25 Pierson v. Post. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) . 26 Foxes were pests in the early 19 th century and not the graceful creatures they are today. 27 I thank Ron Rotunda for the reference.
A negative theory of property: Ius, not use
A distinguishing feature of this step further towards a theory of the emergence of property is its negative character. Nominalizing the problem of property as a right to do X with Y diverts our attention from the rule-guided actions and perceptions of people involving things. As Wittgenstein (1958) recognized, "a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it" (p. 1). Rather than focusing on what people do and feel for property to emerge as a custom, we look for the distinguishing features that define this noun, but a right does not have welldefined boundaries like a chair does. So to aid us with the conceptualization, in the late 19 th century British lawyers began employing a metaphor, property as a bundle of rights, which still persists, though not without its vocal critics. 28 Treating rights bundleable like sticks only more deeply reinforces the notion that rights are things, but because rights aren't things, equally amorphous substantives, such as duties, privileges, powers, and immunities, are called upon to explicate the intricacies of property (see, e.g., Hohfeld 1919) . With all this focus on things, the purpose for property becomes the use of the things (Penner 1997 ).
29
As difficult as it may be for economists to read without falling out of their chairs, the purpose of property, the custom, is not the use of things. The end of a rule of property is to secure from iniuria. That is the sense in which property is negative. The use of things is the ultimate purpose of having things, but a rule of property to possess things does not arise from the use of things. 30 If things were not scarce and people not mischievous, selfish, and limited in within our grasp, but because, proximately, someone with an equal or stronger hand may challenge our grasp. 
